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Abstract: The choices made by political leaders do not merely affect those that hold office, rather
there is a trickle-down effect that touches every life within their nation. The event known as the
Holodomor was a Ukrainian famine during the 1930s. Stalin’s decisions were based upon
impressions created during the Russian famine in the 1920s under Lenin’s leadership. Previous
research supports the widely agreed upon determination that the famine was not a side effect of
natural causes, but rather the direct result of Stalin’s collectivism. Furthermore, the U.N.
declared the event to be genocide and not due to poorly directed actions made by idealistic
leaders, but deliberate actions taken as a result of a political power struggle which resulted in the
deaths of millions. This paper investigates the trickle-down effects of choices made by political
leaders throughout the famine. I have identified tales of survivors, such as that of Aleksandra
Mikhailovna Safronova Graybeal, in which we see the indirect costs of economic choices and
political schemes upon those with no political connections. My exploration of the survivor’s tales
indicates that those with no political power are hit the hardest as the actions of political
machinations take effect over those they govern.
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The event known as the Holodomor of the 1930s lasted merely two short years. However,
the implications that colored every decision made began during a famine in the 1920s. Its
ramifications were profound and extensive. The Ukrainian Famine of 1920, the first Sovietinfluenced famine, was made more complicated by inaction and prejudice. While this famine
rendered the republic devasted, Ukraine's bereavement from the Holodomor signifies that the
damage was far more extreme than anyone could have envisioned and left the republic crushed
beneath the heel of the mighty Soviet Union. The Holodomor, a Ukrainian term meaning death
by starvation (under the connotation of murder or execution), was perpetrated upon Ukraine's
people through deliberate actions taken at Stalin's behest despite multiple pleas from Ukrainian
officials for assistance. Stalin's perceptions of the reality of the Ukrainian Famine situation in
1920 and his personal biases brought forth decisions in the 1930s that were catastrophic. It is
little shifts in opinions, attitudes, and choices that slowly edge closer and closer to taking the
fatal step that ultimately brings about genocide. The Holodomor is the direct result of such shifts.
Like the 1920s famine, the Soviet Union suffered drought, poor organization, and grain
requisition through collectivization. However, in the 1930s, Ukraine was subjected to "active
inaction" due to the role that Stalin's choices played. There is a lasting effect that trickles down
and affects those who have no political pull. This effect identifies the direct and indirect results
of Stalin's choices that led to the death of an estimated 5 million people. The Holodomor
survivors tell of their experiences in vivid imagery, leaving a mental picture of the trickle-down
effect left in the wake of the choices and calculations of the government's elected course of
action.
After the Russian Revolution in 1917, Russia faced many obstacles, many of which held
the slowly forming Soviet Union on the cusp of disaster. Famine was a familiar foe. In 1918,
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Lenin wrote a letter to the Workers of Petrograd addressing the cause of the 1918 famine and
expectation of every person. Lenin insisted that the fault did not lie with the ability to produce
grain; instead, it resulted from hoarding and misappropriation by the bourgeoisie. He set the
order that "He who does not work, neither shall he eat," i thereby establishing the precedent that
only the lazy and selfish were going hungry. According to Lenin, this order had three
requirements for it to succeed in feeding every person. ii The first requirement included a state
grain monopoly, prohibiting any private sale or use of surplus grain. The second was establishing
a faultless transportation organization required to ensure surplus grain movement to areas facing
shortages. iii The third was to set up the proper distribution of bread to all citizens, showing no
favoritism or privilege for those that held financial benefits.
Furthermore, Lenin established a "communist task" for the working and poor citizens to
fight capitalism in all its forms. Lenin stated, "When the people are starving, when
unemployment is becoming ever more terrible, anyone who conceals an extra pood [sic] of grain,
anyone who deprives the state of a pood [sic] of fuel is an out and out criminal." iv This
criminalization of using food outside the government determined necessities created a crusade
among the workers to prove their worth. The same Red Army that gained victory over its enemy
was set in place as the Ukrainian Labour Army. Their efforts were to be focusing on collecting
grains and enforcing the party's economic outlook. In a dispatch from Josef Stalin, as Chairman
of the Ukrainian Labour Army Council, dated in March of 1920, he believed that it was
necessary to approach the economic difficulties in the same way that the Civil War was won. v
Stalin declared that the Labour Army's effort must be "ruthless" with "an unflinching priority" to
gather the required requisitions at any cost as the state interests must come first. vi All food
grains, including those needed for immediate consumption and planting, were to be confiscated.
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Lenin's government intended to bring about an industrial revolution; however, funds were
needed for this process. The Soviet Union was faced with two options, take out loans or export
food that brought a premium price due to famines throughout Europe. The leader chose to avoid
debt; they collected and exported thousands of tons of grain to foreign countries. vii Just as
Ukrainian crops were sent out to the cities, tens of thousands of pounds of grain were earmarked
to be sold to the foreign nations of Germany, France, Finland, and other Western European
countries. In The Bolshevik, a Communist party paper, one week an article celebrated that 16,000
tons of grain were shipped to Hamburg, Germany. The next, it quietly informed its readers that
millions were starving or, worse yet, had died from hunger in Soviet Union. viii The Communist
party line kept the tone neutral when it came to the losses and optimistic in the face of
exportation and growth.
In a report given to the Second All-Russia Congress of Political Education Department
on October 17, 1921, Lenin addressed his concerns and how the NEP addressed the growing
fears that the people were beginning to voice. His approach was to remind the people where they
were economically and stressed the need for order. Lenin called for "strict, stern measures" and
assured those in attendance that if they did not govern with a firmer hand than those that came
before, i.e. the capitalists, they would not be able to "vanquish" them. ix He further declared that
sentiment was as much a crime as cowardice in war, and as such, the "sternest disciplinary
measures" must be adopted. x The desperation of the situation was growing, and Lenin proved
that toleration and accommodations were not allowed in any way.
The world knew of the crises that challenged the Soviet Union in the 1920s. Pravda, the
official Soviet Union newspaper, reported that 25 million faced hunger and eventually
announced that many were dying from starvation. Aid from various countries poured in,
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including that from the United States under J Edgar Hoover's guiding hand. The American Relief
Administration (ARA) provided food for tens of thousands. However, the American's effort fell
under scrutiny and suspicion due to previous underhanded actions and intentions during the
Russian Revolution of 1917. Furthermore, Lenin and Stalin considered Hoover's actions were
disrespectful, a power move, and calculated. Hoover was very vocal in his disdain for
Communism and any government that exported food while its citizens were starving. xi Stalin
further viewed the United States' attempt to assist as a perversion of charity. xii
During Stalin's administration, collectivization was embraced by authorities as a way to
destroy localized, traditional leadership. This effort was specifically true in Ukraine, which
exhibited a desire toward nationalism and independence. There were two primary purposes for
collectivization. The first was to procure enough grain to provide stability, while the Soviet
Union established Stalin's 5-year plan to industrialize. The second purpose was to create gradual
collectivization of the agricultural process and industrialization. These actions were a way of
ensuring that all production was used as declared by the state. This process was intended to take
several years and required compliance among the people, the farmers, and the workers. Stalin
stated that he was not concerned with gaining this compliance through the process as voluntary
adherence could easily be replaced with compulsion. xiii A benefit of the collectivization was to
include the practice of providing machinery and enhanced agricultural techniques. The theories
were taught through educational programs that the peasantry could apply to attend. On paper,
the idea of collectivization was a success waiting to happen; however, the reality was a harsh
instructor.
The original plan for collectivization was to slowly move from each stage to the next as
the path was adequately prepared. In actuality, the progression was swift and ruthless as another
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famine came on the horizon in 1931. Stalin's implementation of Lenin's three requirements for
success failed. The promised machinery and harvest equipment were not readily available for all
to use as needed, often leaving the grain to rot in the fields. xiv While the machines made the
harvest more manageable, they also made the act of gleaning impossible. Policies were set in
place that made it illegal to glean leftover potatoes or the remaining wheat stalk. Nadia Shulha
(nee Symonets) remembered going to collect the wheat stalks and were refused admittance even
though the harvester was broken. xv Locals, all of which who were facing starvation, were not
allowed to use the grain for themselves.
Further problems developed as the transportation to move grain effectively was not
designed in time for harvest seasons. Often grain was found rotten in trucks on roads or in train
cars waiting for transport. Maria Lysenko spoke of grains at the depot waiting for shipment out
of town. xvi Grain was left to sit in train cars or bags along the roads' side as it waited for long
periods to be transported to the cities for use, stored as reserves, and more often than not,
exported to other nations. The grain remained there for months, even through the winter. One
day, out of desperation, a neighbor tried to steal a handful of grain and was "shot on the spot." xvii
Collectivization proved hard for all as grain was not the only item that was confiscated.
Communist demands included chicken eggs and milk that often exceeded the actual production.
Aleksandra (Safranova) Greybeal recalled that if the chicken egg production was insufficient to
meet the requisition demands, the family was still liable to either produce the eggs or pay fines
equivalent to the missing bounty. xviii Another memory concerned the effort they took to reach the
production requirements for milk. Aleksandra's family had taken steps for their cow to produce a
calf, and just before the calf was born, the still pregnant milk cow was confiscated. xix The milk
requirements remained in place, so the family procured a new cow, retraced the steps to produce
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a calf to meet production needs, and it, too, was also confiscated shortly before the calf's birth. xx
Confiscation amidst requirements was not unique to this province and showed that cruelty was
dealt with all. Natalia Talenchuk was the daughter of a factory director, and therefore part of the
elite class. She remembers her classmates coming to school with swollen bodies and seeing their
families at the torgsyn table. This table was set up to exchange heirlooms and jewelry for the
opportunity to harvest grain and corn from the field. Desperate families exchanged their precious
keepsakes for hope. Natalia watched the families as they gleaned in the field and was shocked as
she witnessed them being shot for theft, including every man, woman, and child. xxi This trickledown effect came as a result of leaders heeding the decisions from Stalin's administration. It
affected all of those under their authority.
A strong belief held by party members was that collectivization was a punishment for
those who refused to sell grain to the state. As problems surfaced, communist party members
began to resist collectivization and turned in their party member cards. xxii However,
collectivization meant that power resided with government officials, and all others had lost any
voice about how their lives were spent. Their protesting opinion of collectivization did not
matter, nor did they have a right to work against the local authorities actively. Their lack of
political pull put the party members at a disadvantage and at risk of the effects that would trickle
down. Aleksandra Graybeals's family delayed joining the collective system, and the government
began "putting the squeeze on." xxiii Heavy taxes were levied upon the family, higher demands
and requisitions of production were imposed. They continued harassment that was "designed to
bring [them to their] knees" and force capitulation into joining the system.
Aleksandra's family attempted to make the best of the situation, but there was no bestcase scenario. Maria Boratynksa (nee Myshalov) remembered a man in her village who refused

7

to submit to his personal garden's collectivization. The officials took everything from him and
stated the government-owned everything. xxiv If he did not work, he could not have anything.
They plowed his garden and planted buckwheat. They refused to allow him to harvest the
buckwheat and left it to rot in the yard. Only a single stool was left in the home. He was a
cobbler by trade, and neighbors brought him shoes to fix and paid him with food so that he did
not starve. xxv
Further trickle-down effects came in the form of a black market that included everything
among its goods. Aleksandra Graybeal's family made homemade butter and sold it for two bars
of soap. Her father then resold one soap bar to a neighbor. The neighbor gladly took it in return
for a small amount of grain and then reported Aleksandra's father for selling black market goods
and hoarding grain to the police. Aleksandra's father was imprisoned, and their house was
searched for all food items and the remaining bar of soap. Thankfully, Aleksandra's family was
close to one of the officials, and he was released the next day, but this was not the typical
punishment for those who dealt in black market goods, especially for those that tried to hide
food. Luba Kachmarska's family was not so lucky. Her family grew potatoes and buried several
bags for their later use. Upon hearing a rumor, officials searched until the bags were discovered.
The potatoes were laced with a white, poisonous powder. xxvi The officials confiscated all seeds
and destroyed everything they could find. Luba's father was taken into custody and never
returned home.
The black market held foods that were far from what most would call edible except the
very desperate. Many returned to the foodstuffs of the 1920s famine: grass, horse tack, dogs,
cats, and rats. Soon those items would become just as scarce as grain and potatoes. Nina Kohut
was yelled at by her parents for running out into the street alone. Her parents told her to never go
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alone anywhere without someone older because children were being stolen and ground into
"Schnitzel and pies." At first, she felt her parents were being overly cautious and trying to scare
her into obedience. However, while at the market, she witnessed a police officer eating a pie
when he found a "piece of nail and finger in it." xxvii This moment brought on a dawning
realization of the hazardous act of running alone. Likewise, Vera Shumylo remembered a
schoolmate that went missing after seeing her looking nothing but "skin and bones." Rumors
were running around that her schoolmate was ground for food. xxviii She refused to believe it.
During dinner one night, she found a fingernail in some sausage her mother had picked up from
the market that day. Startled, Vera called for her mother and was told, "daughter, be quiet," as
the meal continued in disturbed silence. xxix The black market provided provisions at a high cost.
This trickle-down effect cost the lives of many as neighbors turned on neighbors, and soon even
those meager provisions were not enough.
Many tried to run from starvation. Attempts to cross the border were made on the trains,
on roads, and through the woods. Aleksandra Greybeal's parents, out of desperation, sent
Aleksandra, age 8, and her sisters into the city in the hopes that they would find food more
readily available. xxx The girls snuck onto the train and hid beneath the seats, remaining there for
the trip’s duration. Upon arrival in the city, the girls had nowhere to go, no relatives to turn to, so
they survived the best they could on the streets. They ate food out of the trash, begged for scraps,
and worked until they were too sick and forced to return home. Others tried to leave the republic
with the intention to bring food home to their families. Like Vera Shumylo's mother, many
Ukrainians would take their family heirlooms into the city and exchange them for food.
However, upon their return, the police inspected their belongings to confiscate all food from
other areas into the region. Further attempts to leave were to escape the famine altogether.
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However, most of the peasantry did not have passports or travel papers, like Fedir Tkachenko's
family. They moved from place to place in hiding as their mother attempted to avoid arrest for
leaving their home region without the legal right to find food. xxxi Eventually, those families were
caught and dealt harsh punishments.
In January 1933, Stalin's choices brought new hardships in the form of the Law of
Inviolability of Socialist Property. xxxii This law reintroduced all food and production
confiscations, stopped all food deliveries from outside of Ukraine, and instituted the "5 ears of
wheat" law. This law condemned anyone, even suspected of theft, to death or ten years of hard
labor (normally reserved for treason and murder). xxxiii The trickle-down effect was that men,
women, and children began dying. Stalin chose to acknowledge a poor harvest as the cause of the
deaths. Moreover, Stalin didn't blame the deaths on the collectivization practices, the increased
quotas, or the cessation of assistance; instead, he accused 35 party leaders of conspiracy and
treason. xxxiv Stalin blamed them for sabotaging the harvest.
Ukrainian Nationalism's return became a hated perspective by Soviet leaders, especially
by Stalin, whose personal bias was confirmed by the increasing objection to collectivization.
Stalin's administration anchored its beliefs in working together and shunning the individual, both
the person and the nation. The Ukrainian desire to be independent of the Soviet Union was the
antithesis of communistic tendencies. This resurgence of nationalism encouraged Stalin's belief
that the grain growers and those starving were not innocent. Although communist party leaders
within Ukraine requested assistance, Stalin's refusal burned with contempt for the growers. It
indicated that they were not victims but perpetrators of war against Soviet power. xxxv Stalin
elected to further his dedication to Ukraine's utter destruction, including those with no political
power or public influence. He never denied his actions in 1933 caused the deaths of millions of
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people. However, Stalin stated that his inactions were due to the choices made by the victims
themselves. He indicated that had they worked harder, been more dedicated to the cause, and not
fought against Communism, they would have survived, thus echoing Lenin's declaration that he
who does not work does not eat. Stalin denounced nationalism during a congress meeting in
1934, declaring war on Ukraine as these "former people" were a danger to the Soviet Union. xxxvi
In a Ukrainian leader letter, Mikhail Kaganovich requested assistance for the people
stating the dire situation. However, in his letter, he inadvertently conveyed to Stalin the attitudes
and sentiments of the people he represented. These reports included much of the party members'
responses to the increased requisitions of grain, stating that many people began fighting
collectivization, not out of true anti-collectivization sentiment, but rather out of sheer
necessity. xxxvii The requisition orders were far too high for the famine-stricken land to produce.
Stalin's response could have saved the Ukrainian people.
Lenin's choices during the famine in the 1920s brought about Stalin's belief that
Ukrainian leaders and party members were not on the side of the Soviet Union. He felt that all
requests for assistance were due to poor work ethics, individual laziness, and the intention to
undermine the Soviet leader. Every choice he made echoed his opinion, and the outcome held
consequences that Stalin embraced. Throughout the Holodomor, Stalin was consulted about each
new development. He dismissed the reports detailing the dire straits that Ukraine faced. His
outstanding beliefs that Ukraine was against him and the Soviet Union drove him, and in this, he
allowed his choices to be dictated by his biases. Stalin's political decisions during the Holodomor
were intended to bring the republic under the Soviet wing. While it succeeded in bringing
Ukraine to heel, it was the trickle-down effects that held a far higher cost than mere political
submission. The farmers watched their grain rot in the fields and streets; the elderly sacrificed
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themselves so their grandchildren could have a chance only for them to go missing. Stalin, the
Ukrainian authorities, and individual Communist party members made each choice much fartherreaching than political boundaries and power struggles. Those decisions are etched on the hearts
and minds of every child that survived the atrocities. They held no power and played no role in
the decisions made, and yet, as the effects trickled down from choices made by the political
machinations, it was the people who became targeted and destroyed all in the name of power.
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